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Abstract 
Literature on the 1984-5 miners’ strike in Britain tends to be dominated by 
examination of peak level relations between the Conservative government, 
the National Coal Board (NCB) and the National Union of Mineworkers 
(NUM). The strike is usually depicted as being illegitimately imposed, without 
a national ballot, on the industry and the miners by the NUM leadership. This 
article develops a more rounded perspective on the strike, by locating its 
origins in workplace conflict which had been steadily escalating in the early 
1980s in the Scottish coalfields. A significant portion of Scottish miners, 
anxious about employment prospects, and angry about managerial incursions 
on established joint industrial regulation of daily mining operations, pushed 
their union towards a more militant position. This subverts the conventional 
picture of the strike as a top-down phenomenon. In this respect events in 
Scotland, which rarely feature in established literature, were in fact extremely 
important, shaping the national strike that emerged from the workforce’s 
opposition to managerial authoritarianism as well as the closure of 
‘uneconomic’ pits. The peak level context of deteriorating relations and pit 
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level details of incrementally intensifying workplace conflict are established 
through industry and trade union records and press accounts. 
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The 1984-5 miners’ strike was a major event in Britain’s late twentieth century 
development.1 Its outcome, a shattering defeat for the miners and the labour 
movement more broadly, substantially altered Britain’s subsequent economic 
and social trajectory, accelerating the transition from the privileging of 
producer to consumer interests and, in the spheres of work and employment 
relations, collective to individual identities.2 The strike is usually understood in 
terms of peak level relations between the Conservative government, the NCB 
and the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), with special emphasis on the 
roles of Margaret Thatcher, the Conservative Prime Minister, Ian MacGregor, 
NCB Chairman, and Arthur Scargill, NUM President, along with the 
movements in energy supply that decisively weakened the miners’ bargaining 
                                                 
1 Research for this article was conducted with support from the Adam Smith Research 
Foundation at the University of Glasgow. 
2 Colin Crouch, ‘From Labour Legislation and Public Policy towards a Flexible Labour 
Market: The Ambiguous Privatization of a Policy Area’, Historical Studies in Industrial 
Relations, 23/24 (2007), 233-50; Paul Davies and Mark Freedland, Towards a Flexible 
Labour Market: Labour Legislation and Regulation since the 1990s (Oxford, 2007). 
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position.3 Standard accounts normally also represent the strike as being 
illegitimately imposed, without a national ballot, on the industry and the miners 
by the NUM leadership, which ignored the logic of energy market changes 
and opposed any pit closures on economic grounds.4 There are some studies 
of the strike that look beneath the surface of high politics. But these tend to 
overlook developments in the ‘marginal’ coalfields of Scotland, Durham and 
South Wales, reproducing the geographical focus of the high politics literature 
on the divisions between Yorkshire and Nottinghamshire.5
This article contributes to the historiography of the strike by locating 
and examining its origins in pit-level workplace conflict in Scotland. Miners 
anxious about employment prospects, and angry about managerial incursions 
on established joint industrial regulation of daily mining operations, pushed 
their union towards a more militant position. This subverts the conventional 
                                                 
3 Martin Adeney and John Lloyd, The Miners’ Strike, 1984-5: Loss Without Limit (London, 
1986); Paul Routledge, Scargill. The unauthorized biography (London, 1993); David Stewart, 
‘A Tragic “Fiasco”? The 1984-5 Miners’ Strike in Scotland’, Scottish Labour History, 41 
(2006), 34-50; Andrew Taylor, The NUM and British Politics. Volume 2: 1969-1995 
(Aldershot, 2005). 
4 Robert Taylor, The Trade Union Question in British Politics (Cambridge, 1993), 294-8; 
Alastair J. Reid, United We Stand. A History of Britain’s Trade Unions (Harmondsworth, 
2004), 402-4. 
5 Raphael Samuel, B. Bloomfield and G. Bonas (eds), The Enemies Within: Pit Villages and 
the Miners’ Strike of 1984-5 (London, 1986); Huw Beynon (ed.), Digging Deeper. Issues in 
the Miners’ Strike (London, 1985); J. Winterton and R. Winterton, Coal, Crisis and Conflict: 
The 1984-85 Miners’ Strike in Yorkshire (Manchester, 1989),; Andrew J. Richards, Miners 
On Strike. Class Solidarity and Division in Britain (Oxford, 1996). 
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way of understanding the strike as a top-down phenomenon, forced on the 
workforce by the union leadership. Events in Scotland were extremely 
important in this respect, shaping the national strike that emerged from the 
workforce’s opposition to the closure of ‘uneconomic’ pits. Scottish collieries 
were highly vulnerable on these grounds. At the peak level joint industrial 
meeting on 6 March 1984 that immediately preceded the strike, the NCB 
circulated data purporting to show an overall projected deep-mining loss of 
£105.4 million on the 97.4 million tonnes of coal that would be mined in 1984-
5: more than half of this deficit – £55.1 million – would be generated in 
producing just 5.15 million tonnes of coal in its Scottish Area.6 In this context 
of market uncertainty industrial relations were highly adversarial: 50 per cent 
of miners in Scotland were already engaged in pit-level disputes in March 
1984 when the national strike began. These disputes arose from the 
increasingly autocratic management of the industry in Scotland from 1982 to 
early 1984 that stemmed from anxieties about the insecure market position of 
Scottish coal. The strike is presented here as a legitimate and roughly 
democratic trade union response to the NCB Scottish Area’s managerial style 
and strategy. It was not imposed externally on Scotland, via the ideological 
conflict between Conservative government and NUM leadership, but in fact 
                                                 
6 The National Archives: Public Record Office, Kew (hereafter TNA: PRO), COAL 74/4783, 
Coal Industry National Consultative Council Minutes (hereafter CINCC), 6 March 1984. 
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developed much of its national – that is, UK-wide – logic from the conflict 
between management and workers in the Scottish coalfields.7
From 1982 the strategy of the NCB’s Scottish Area management 
involved ‘testing’ the supposed militancy of miners in Scotland by closing pits 
and making significant incursions on trade union responsibilities and 
privileges. The strategy was developed within the high political context of the 
1980 Coal Industry Act, together with the 1983 Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission (MMC) report on the NCB.8 These combined to produce a firm 
emphasis, in the context of market changes in energy supply, on controlling 
costs and tightening managerial control of production. Pits with relatively 
expensive production records were targeted, with new managers introduced 
by Albert Wheeler, the NCB’s Scottish Area Director, who appeared keen to 
disrupt established management-union relations. Disputes were consequently 
provoked, sometimes where pre-shift emergency union meetings had been 
called to discuss responses to managerial initiatives that contravened joint 
industrial procedures. Workers subsequently reporting for work a few minutes 
late were sent home without pay. The established right of union delegates to 
conduct union business on NCB premises and in working hours was also 
challenged. The resulting incremental dissolution of the low level of ‘trust’, as 
                                                 
7 Terry Brotherstone and Simon Pirani, ‘Were There Alternatives? Movements from Below in 
the Scottish Coalfield, the Communist Party, and Thatcherism, 1981-1985’, Critique, 36-7 
(2005), 99-124. 
8 The Monopolies and Mergers Commission, National Coal Board. A Report on the efficiency 
and costs in the development, production and supply of coal by the National Coal Board, 
Cmnd. 8920 (HMSO, 1983), Volumes One and Two. 
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management and industrial relations scholars would term it,9 between 
management and employees, was instrumental to the outbreak of the strike in 
March 1984. 
‘Trust’ in the coal industry was based on a complex pattern of joint 
industrial management. The nationalization arrangements in 1947 had 
encompassed a role for union and workforce representatives in managing 
various operational matters, including the design and execution of work, 
transferring miners between pits, especially where closures were projected, 
and health and safety questions.10 This local joint industrial regulation 
buttressed peak level bargaining between the NCB and mining unions on 
wages and conditions of work more generally. These managerial and 
bargaining arrangements set coalmining apart from much of industry in the 
UK, the broad features of which were neatly summarized in Alan Fox’s 1966 
research paper for the Donovan Commission on trade unions and employers’ 
organizations. This made the important distinction between ‘market relations’, 
the ‘terms and conditions on which labour is hired’, and ‘managerial relations’, 
‘what management seeks to do with its labour having hired it’. Fox noted that 
while many employers accepted the legitimacy of settling market relations 
collectively rather than individually, there was strong resistance still in the 
                                                 
9 Peter Boxall and John Purcell, Strategy and Human Resource Management (Basingstoke, 
2008); Karen Legge, Human Resource Management: Rhetoric and Realities (Basingstoke, 
2005). 
10 Adeney and Lloyd, Miners’ Strike, 3-4. 
 7
1960s to trade union influence in managerial relations.11 An authoritative 
survey of workplace relations twenty years later indicated that little had 
changed, with only a limited extension of employee involvement in managerial 
decision-making across a variety of industrial sectors.12 In the coal industry 
workers’ representatives, through local joint industrial regulation and peak 
level collective negotiations, clearly enjoyed an unusual degree of purchase in 
determining managerial as well as market relations.13 But in Scotland from 
1982 onwards NCB managers, seeking greater cost control, subverted 
established arrangements, and so contributed to a substantial escalation of 
workplace conflict. Workers engaged in these disputes pressed NUM officials 
to adopt a more militant position, although moves to take strike action in 
Scotland at various points between December 1982 and March 1984 against 
closures as well as managerial authoritarianism were blocked by divisions 
within the union’s Scottish membership. A significant minority, demoralized by 
events, were not prepared to risk open conflict. This complex position, with 
the union pushed and constrained by competing strands of workplace opinion, 
before eventually effecting a militant collective response, contradicts the 
predominant view in the literature of the strike as an unambiguous top-down 
phenomenon. It also negates the suggestion that the strike in its Scottish 
                                                 
11 Alan Fox, Industrial Sociology and Industrial Relations; Royal Commission on Trade 
Unions and Employers’ Associations, Research Papers, 3 (HMSO, 1966), 6-7. 
12 Neil Millward and Mark Stevens, British Workplace Industrial Relations, 1980-1984 
(Aldershot, 1986), 36-53, 151-65. 
13 Jim Phillips, ‘Industrial Relations, Historical Contingencies and Political Economy: Britain 
in the 1960s and 1970s’, Labour History Review, 21 (2007), 215-33. 
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context was an exogenous imposition, arising from ideological conflict 
elsewhere in the UK between the government and the NUM.14
 The article continues with a discussion of the high industrial politics of 
coal, which were important, involving attempts by the 1979 Conservative 
government to control and diminish state subsidy of mining through first the 
1980 Coal Industry Act and then the 1983 MMC report, and deteriorating 
relations between NCB and NUM officials which are traced chiefly from 
minutes of meetings and correspondence between the two sides. These 
developments, especially the MMC report, encouraged initiatives already 
being undertaken by NCB officials to diminish the involvement of workforce 
representatives in the conduct of Fox’s ‘managerial relations’ in Scottish 
collieries. These are examined in the final section of the article, with particular 
details from two collieries, Seafield and Monktonhall, to illustrate the 
dissolution of trust between managers and workers, and the incremental 
intensification of workplace conflict that eventually contributed to the outbreak 
of the national strike in March 1984. This analysis makes extensive use of 
little used archival sources, including government and National Coal Board 
(NCB) files released under Freedom of Information, and union materials 
located in the National Library of Scotland and the Scottish Mining Museum. 
 
 
The high political context of pit-level conflict 
                                                 
14 Keith Aitken, The Bairns O’ Adam. The Story of the STUC (Edinburgh, 1997), 273-81. The 
strike has also been characterized as an exogenous imposition in Wales: Joe England, The 
Wales TUC. Devolution and Industrial Politics (Cardiff, 2004), 61-4. 
 9
 
Pit-level workplace conflict in the early 1980s was shaped by the changes in 
the high politics of the industry initiated by the election of Thatcher’s 
Conservative government in 1979. High political accounts of the 1984-5 strike 
often intimate the Prime Minister’s desire to ‘avenge’ the supposed humiliation 
of the previous Conservative government in the NUM’s victorious strikes of 
1972 and 1974, which were sustained by the substantial material grievances 
and engaged involvement of union members. Conservative leaders 
overlooked the role of popular agency in these disputes, however, 
emphasizing instead their allegedly undemocratic and intimidatory 
characteristics.15 Although conflict with miners and their unions was not 
directly sought by the new government initially, the 1980 Coal Industry Act 
established the goal of an entirely self-funding, unsubsidized sector by 1983-
4. This was ‘almost impossible’ to achieve, according to the coal industry’s 
official historian: while revenues were falling as the recession reduced 
industrial demand for coal, the NCB still had to invest heavily in the 
modernization of capital stock. The related rapid rise in unemployment, 
particularly in manufacturing industries, complicated the position further, 
making it more difficult to remove ‘surplus’ NCB labour through redundancy.16 
The relatively young age profile of the workforce aggravated this difficulty, 
according to Ned Smith, the NCB’s Industrial Relations Director General, with 
                                                 
15 Jim Phillips, ‘The 1972 Miners’ Strike: popular agency and industrial politics in Britain’, 
Contemporary British History, 20 (2006), 187-207. 
16 William Ashworth, The History of the British Coal Industry. Volume 5, 1946-1982: the 
Nationalized Industry (Oxford, 1986), 414-15. 
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a dwindling number of miners aged 50 and over remaining by the early 1980s. 
Bringing production into line with demand would therefore be expensive, to 
the NCB and the government, in terms of significantly enhanced redundancy 
terms to younger miners, and to the coalfield communities stripped of well-
paid employment.17
The social costs of the Coal Industry Act were strongly criticized, by 
Labour’s Parliamentary spokesmen, David Owen and Alex Eadie, in private 
talks with the NCB and in the House of Commons,18 and by mining unions in 
discussions with the NCB, the NUM articulating a rigid opposition to pit 
closures on market or economic grounds.19 Tensions were further heightened 
in the autumn and winter of 1980-81, initially in the context of annual pay 
negotiations, and then when the NCB admitted that the Coal Industry Act 
necessitated large-scale pit closures. The NCB’s pay offer in November was 
characterized by the NUM’s Scottish Area leadership as ‘Tory wage restraint’, 
with the union national executive’s recommendation that the terms be 
accepted a ‘sell-out’. In a ballot of NUM members on the offer 73 per cent of 
votes in Scotland were against acceptance, as were 64.6 per cent in 
Yorkshire, 67.2 per cent in South Wales and 59.3 per cent in Kent. In 
Nottinghamshire 77.3 per cent of votes were in the opposite direction, as were 
                                                 
17 Ned Smith, The 1984 Miners’ Strike. The Actual Account (Whitstable, 1997), 12-15. 
18 TNA: PRO, COAL 30/615, Note of Discussion between Sir Derek Ezra, NCB Chairman, 
and Labour Party Representatives, 3 June 1980; Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Fifth 
Series, 986, 17 June 1980, 1387-93, 1455-61. 
19 TNA: PRO, COAL 31/262, Minutes of a Meeting between the NCB and the National 
Executive Committee of the NUM, Hobart House, 18 June 1980. 
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78.7 per cent in the Midlands, contributing to the decisive 56-44 margin in 
favour of the offer.20
The relative although by no means homogeneous militancy of miners in 
Scotland owed much to embedded historical tradition. The legacy of the pre-
1947 privately-owned industry, highly adversarial workplace relations, was 
partly ameliorated in the intial phase of nationalization, but substantial 
tensions re-emerged with the accelerated pit closures of the 1960s. A newer, 
angry mood was reflected in the election of Michael McGahey, a Communist, 
as NUM Scottish Area President in 1967, and the prominent role of Scottish 
miners in the national disputes of 1972 and 1973-4.21 McGahey narrowly lost 
the national presidential election of 1971 but as national Vice President was 
prominent across British coalfield and industrial politics until his retirement in 
1987.22 The NUM’s Scottish Area leadership, which included other 
Communists, was duly committed in broad terms to the ‘left’ strategy 
emerging in the early 1980s, articulated by the President from 1982, Arthur 
Scargill, of mobilising union activists and members to resist further closures 
through industrial action. Such strategy was prefigured by the crisis of 
February 1981, triggered by the NCB’s proposed response to the Coal 
Industry Act and the recession-engineered drop in demand for coal. 
Continued capital investment would be financed through increased sales, 
obtained through lowering unit costs and more competitive marketing. But the 
                                                 
20 Scottish Miner, December 1980. 
21 Jim Phillips, The Industrial Politics of Devolution: Scotland in the 1960s and 1970s 
(Manchester, 2008), 117-41. 
22 Michael McGahey, Obituary, by Vic Allen, The Guardian, 1 February 1999. 
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price of aligning supply with demand was the withdrawal of ten million tonnes 
per annum of capacity,23 requiring perhaps fifty closures over the five years, 
and the probable loss of 30,000 jobs. Cardowan in Lanarkshire was the 
largest Scottish pit threatened, the others including Highhouse and Sorn in 
Ayrshire.24 Unofficial walk-outs ensued in protest at every pit in Scotland, and 
at a number of English and Welsh collieries. McGahey indicated that pithead 
meetings would be convened to make this strike official in Scotland, as 
Wheeler told him that Cardowan, Sorn and Highhouse would definitely 
close.25 With the NUM executive agreeing unanimously to ballot for a national 
strike, pushed – McGahey emphasised privately – by the militancy of its 
members,26 the government announced an unexpected u-turn. Cash limits on 
the industry, including the requirement to break even by 1983-4, were to be 
reviewed, and coal imports reduced: the unofficial strikes came to an end 
within two days.27
 The government was, of course, essaying strategic retreat rather than 
surrender. McGahey, whose sense of history was rooted in the experiences of 
                                                 
23 Ashworth, British Coal Industry, 416-17. 
24 The Times, 11 and 19 February 1981. 
25 Scottish Miner, February 1981. 
26 Scottish Mining Museum, Newtongrange (hereafter SMM), National Union of 
Mineworkers Scottish Area (hereafter NUMSA), Minute of Conference of Delegates, 20 
February 1981. 
27 The Economist, 21 February 1981, 35-6. 
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his father, sacked and victimized after the 1926 mining crisis,28 likened events 
to ‘Red Friday’ in 1925,29 when Stanley Baldwin’s Conservative government 
averted a national coal strike by subsidizing extant wages for twelve months 
while organizing the emergency apparatus that broke the eventual post-
subsidy lockout and General Strike.30 McGahey was right about the Thatcher 
government’s motives in 1981. While the cash limits and break-even targets 
of the Coal Industry Act were moderated by further legislation in 1982 and 
1983,31 the ‘Ridley’ programme for breaking any future miners’ strike was 
developed, with new policing initiatives and the planned movement of coal, 
including increased imports, by non-union road haulage firms.32 The NCB, 
meanwhile, quietly pursued its rationalization agenda at a local level. In the 
two years from March 1981 twenty pits were shut, the largest number of 
closures in a two-year period since 1973-4.33 These developments rather 
belied the immediate claim in 1981 in an Institute of Economic Affairs-
                                                 
28 Alan Campbell, ‘Reflections on the 1926 Mining Lockout’, Historical Studies in Industrial 
Relations, 21 (2006), 181. 
29 Scottish Miner, February 1981. 
30 John McIlroy, Alan Campbell and Keith Gildart, ‘Introduction: 1926 and All That’, in John 
McIlroy, Alan Campbell and Keith Gildart (eds), Industrial Politics and the 1926 Mining 
Lockout (Cardiff, 2004), 1-11. 
31 Winterton and Winterton, Coal, Crisis and Conflict, 20-2. 
32 Taylor, NUM and British Politics, 158-62. 
33 Ashworth, British Coal Industry, 418-9. 
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published pamphlet that the government and the NCB had cravenly bowed to 
the NUM’s ‘monopoly power’.34
 The government’s interest in seeking greater cost control in the coal 
industry was then pursued by another route, with the MMC appointed to 
investigate the NCB in March 1982. The NUM anticipated that this would 
generate substantial political pressure for the closure of mines on economic 
grounds. In discussions with Triple Alliance union partners in Scotland, the 
railwaymen and steel workers, McGahey linked this government-instigated 
‘attack’ on nationalized industry with the incursions on trade union rights and 
privileges – chiefly in restricting the establishment and operation of union 
closed shops – that were embodied in the 1982 Employment Bill that was 
going through Parliament.35 The MMC inquiry and later report confirmed 
McGahey’s pessimism and contributed substantially to an erosion of trust 
between management and the workforce. NCB materials prepared for the 
MMC, detailing losses at numerous pits, were leaked to the NUM, just as it 
was concluding a strike ballot over predicted closures and the annual pay 
offer in October 1982. This yielded a decisive majority of 61 per cent against 
strike action, but there were majorities in favour in four areas: Kent and 
Scotland, both with 69 per cent, South Wales, with 59, and Yorkshire, with 56. 
Scargill argued that the MMC papers amounted to a closure ‘hit list’. Meeting 
the NUM on 23 November, the NCB claimed that the papers represented 
                                                 
34 Colin Robinson and Eileen Marshall, What Future for British Coal? (London, 1981), 13-
15. 
35 National Library of Scotland (hereafter NLS), Acc. 9805/263, Minute of Meeting of Triple 
Alliance, NUM (Scottish Area) offices, Edinburgh, Tuesday 4 May 1982. 
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‘research material’ rather than strategic planning,36 although its chairman, 
Norman Siddall, had gathered reports beforehand from Area Directors, and 
Wheeler’s submission signalled an interest in closing Highhouse, Sorn and 
Killoch – also in Ayrshire – and Cardowan, ‘heavy losers’ all.37 The NUM then 
produced a new ‘hit list’, of 55 pits, which in Scotland included Kinneil in West 
Lothian along with the four identified by Wheeler.38
 The ‘hit list’ controversy contributed to a further deterioration of peak 
level industrial relations, with NUM officials protesting by boycotting the 
industry’s National Consultative Council from November 1982 to March 
1983,39 and deepened workplace anxieties in Scotland about the industry’s 
future. The MMC findings, submitted to the Department of Trade before 
Christmas 1982,40 but not published by the government until after the General 
Election in June 1983, confirmed the essence of these concerns. A ten per 
cent cut in capacity was recommended, through closing pits with the highest 
losses per tonne.41 Escalating labour costs were identified as exacerbating 
the industry’s unprofitability. Wages as a proportion of production costs had 
been increasing since the early 1970s, with miners exploiting the market 
                                                 
36 TNA: PRO, COAL 31/264, Statement to be made by Mr Siddall to the meeting with the 
NUM on 23 November 1982 on Mr Scargill’s ‘Disclosures’ on Colliery Closure. 
37 TNA: PRO, COAL 31/824, Wheeler to Siddall, 16 November 1982. 
38The Times, 24 and 27 November 1982. 
39 TNA: PRO, COAL 74/4783, CINCC, 9 November 1982, 11 January 1983, 1 February 
1983, 8 March 1983, 10 May 1983. 
40 TNA: PRO, COAL 74/4783, CINCC, 1 February 1983. 
41 MMC, National Coal Board, Volume One, 363-6. 
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advantages conferred by the escalating cost of oil relative to coal.42 But the 
MMC related this outcome to the structure and composition of NCB 
management, with too many ‘home-grown mining engineers’ crowding out the 
potentially liberating presence of cost-controlling business executives from 
private industry.43 Perhaps this especially is why Ian MacGregor, who became 
NCB Chairman in September 1983, characterized the report as his ‘bible’.44
The MMC report emphasized the particularly uncompetitive nature of 
the ‘peripheral coal-mining Areas’.45 Productivity, including regional 
differentials, emerged in the 1970s as concerns at the NCB. Area-based 
incentive schemes were introduced in 1977-8, against union opposition in 
Kent, South Wales, Yorkshire and Scotland, but no particular overall 
productivity improvement resulted. Incentive earnings tended to be greater in 
areas where productivity was already higher, notably in Nottinghamshire. To 
the industry’s official historian this suggested that ‘low productivity may 
encourage habits and practices that tend to prolong it even when 
opportunities for change arise’.46 But critics of the incentive schemes 
observed that area bonus differentials essentially reflected the comparative 
ease of coal-getting in more ‘productive’ areas, rather than the efforts 
expended, say, by Scottish as opposed to Nottinghamshire miners.47
                                                 
42 Robinson and Marshall, British Coal, 23-8, 51-2. 
43 MMC, National Coal Board, Volume One, 380-2. 
44 Adeney and Lloyd, Miners’ Strike, 23, 27. 
45 MMC, National Coal Board, Volume One, 178. 
46 Ashworth, British Coal Industry, 371-3. 
47 Winterton and Winterton, Coal, Crisis and Conflict, 15-17. 
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 This latter perspective was perhaps illustrated by the MMC’s Scottish 
findings. Twelve Scottish collieries were identified as producing coal in 1981-
2, the report omitting two others, Kinneil and Polmaise in Stirlingshire, both 
subject to development.48 One of the producers, the ‘Longannet complex’ in 
West Fife, actually encompassed three separate collieries: Solsgirth, 
Castlehill and Bogside. These each fed coal by underground conveyance to 
Longannet, a huge South of Scotland Electricity Board power station.49 
Longannet’s average output per man shift (OMS) in 1981-2 was 3.1 tonnes, 
the highest in Scotland, and exceeding the average across all NCB collieries 
of 2.4 tonnes. Among the other Scottish collieries only Monktonhall in 
Midlothian, with an OMS of 2.3 tonnes, neared the NCB average.50 It is not 
possible to deduce from the MMC material that Longannet’s superior 
productivity was simply the consequence of its technologically advanced 
extraction and conveyance, but it is also unlikely that the productivity gap to 
other Scottish pits was largely a question of worker effort and practices, as the 
official historian implied in his general deductions, and some NCB officials in 
Scotland alleged, as will become clear in the final part of this article. 
 The MMC drew attention also to the extent of losses in Scotland. Of the 
‘twelve’ producers, six were losing more than £10 per tonne, and the others 
between £0 and £10 per tonne. The worst losses, £38.30 per tonne, were at 
                                                 
48 For detailed histories of these pits see Miles K. Oglethorpe, Scottish Collieries. An 
Inventory of the Scottish Coal Industry in the Nationalised Era (Edinburgh, 2006). 
49 Ashworth, British Coal Industry, 97. 
50 MMC, National Coal Board, Volume Two, Appendices 3.3 and 3.5a. 
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Cardowan.51 The MMC acknowledged the political difficulty of closing pits in 
‘peripheral’ areas where unemployment was already significantly above the 
UK average, but this was characterized as the government’s responsibility, to 
ignore or remedy through regional policy.52 The NCB’s sole duty was to 
control costs, and the report’s vivid findings duly placed great pressure on 
Scottish Area management to do so urgently. These observations chimed with 
a strategy already being developed by Albert Wheeler, involving costs 
controls in two ways: closing higher losing pits; and strengthening managerial 
prerogative by diminishing the role of joint industrial consultation, particularly 
in the sphere of what Alan Fox termed ‘managerial relations’, the manner in 
which labour was deployed. 
 
 
Workplace conflict and the origins of the miners’ strike 
 
Wheeler’s interest in closing collieries on economic grounds actually preceded 
the publication of the MMC report. In the summer of 1982, before the ‘hit list’ 
controversy, Wheeler persuaded the NCB to abandon underground 
development work in progress at Kinneil since 1978, connecting it to 
Longannet.53 He claimed that geological difficulties associated with this work 
                                                 
51 MMC, National Coal Board, Volume One, 176. 
52 MMC, National Coal Board, Volume One, 369. 
53 TNA: PRO, COAL 89/222, P.M. Moullin, Deputy Secretary, NCB, to M. McNamara, 
Secretary, Scottish Area, 17 September 1982. 
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had created unacceptably high costs, and asked that the pit be shut.54 Despite 
the opposition of workers, who were offered transfers to other pits, and the 
intervention of the NUM’s national executive,55 Kinneil was closed at the end 
of December. Attempts were made by union officials to muster a Scottish 
Area-wide strike in protest, through the established bureaucratic instruments 
of Area executive and pithead meetings.56 These failed, with only a handful of 
pits coming out in support of Kinneil, illustrating in stark form the difficulty of 
defending endangered collieries through collective action.57 The Area 
executive heard that some miners were pessimistic and feared isolation, 
doubting that action in defence of Kinneil would receive support beyond 
Scotland. Others resented the hand being offered to Kinneil, when the union 
had recently accepted the closure of other pits, notably Valleyfield in West 
Fife in 1978 and Bedlay in Lanarkshire in 1981.58 This outcome perhaps 
encouraged Wheeler that the militancy of Scotland’s miners, evidenced most 
                                                 
54 National Archives of Scotland (hereafter NAS), CB 335/14/1, Deputy Press Officer, 
Scottish Area, National Coal Board, to Chief Press Officer, National Coal Board, 17 
September 1982. 
55 NAS, CB 335/14/1, Kinneil Colliery: Note of an informal meeting with the NUM held on 
Tuesday 14 December 1982 in the Board Room, Hobart House. 
56 SMM, NUMSA, Minute of Meeting of Executive Committee (hereafter EC), 20 December 
1982. 
57 Glasgow Herald, 28 and 29 December 1982. 
58 SMM, NUMSA, EC, 27 December 1982, and Joint Conference of Mining Unions, 28 
December 1982. 
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recently in the 69 per cent vote for strike action against closures in the NUM’s 
October 1982 ballot,59 might not obstruct his strategy.60
In 1983 Wheeler closed the small Ayrshire pits of Sorn and Highhouse 
before turning to Cardowan. Other Scottish pits were drawn into this conflict 
as the NCB attempted to weaken efforts to save Cardowan by dispersing its 
workforce. Transfers of Cardowan men were resisted by miners at ‘receiving’ 
collieries, largely because the NCB ignored the time-consuming established 
joint industrial procedures for managing this process, and partly because the 
men seeking transfers were regarded within the NUM as renegades for 
abandoning their pit.61 Where the transfers were opposed Wheeler ordered 
that work cease altogether, so there were lengthy lock-outs at Cardowan and 
Polmaise, and stoppages at Bogside, Frances in Central Fife and Polkemmet 
in West Lothian.62 This attrition eventually proved effective. When the NCB 
announced Cardowan’s immediate closure on 25 August, the remaining 750 
men – some 300 having accepted voluntary redundancy or transfer by 
agreement with union representatives – voted by a majority of 3 to 2 against 
industrial action to save the pit.63 McGahey explained this in terms of 
management ‘duplicity’, the transfers in particular diminishing efforts to save 
Cardowan, and the macro-economic environment. ‘Miners did not live in 
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isolation’, he advised comrades on the Scottish Area executive, ‘and their 
morale had been affected by 4 million unemployed’.64
 After Cardowan, and perhaps spurred by the MMC report which 
appeared in June, Wheeler opened the second phase of his cost-control 
campaign. It has been written, and bears repeating here, that Wheeler 
pioneered MacGregor-style methods.65 This runs true in his approach to 
closures, but especially also in his emphasis on deconstructing joint industrial 
regulation, which only emerged in full force in England after the 1984-5 
strike.66 In Scotland the NCB adopted an aggressively anti-union line from the 
closure of Kinneil onwards, with Wheeler squeezing his managers – and 
rotating them around collieries – to maximize short-term economic 
performance. The case of Seafield in Central Fife, which opened in 1966 and 
employed 1,300 miners in 1983, is highly germane here. In the NCB’s ‘bottom 
30’ in performance terms every year since 1976,67 the pit’s consultative 
committee minutes are highly revealing. At the beginning of the 1980s union-
management relations remained positive despite the entrenched nature of the 
colliery’s productivity difficulties. In July 1981, for instance, with output 
continually falling below target, a joint industrial team was established to 
explore the optimization of production. ‘This’, the official minutes read, ‘would 
not be a fault finding exercise but a genuine attempt to improve the current 
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situation’.68 But such emphasis on cooperative trust-building is rare in the 
committee’s proceedings from May 1983, when George Caldow arrived from 
Comrie in West Fife to become Seafield’s new manager. Caldow and his staff 
adopted an increasingly abrasive position, explaining the pit’s historic shortfall 
in output in terms of the workforce’s low work ethic, manifested in a refusal to 
operate ‘diligently’ and high levels of absenteeism. This claim was not 
unfounded, with a very modest increase in absenteeism, from around 13 per 
cent of all employees in 1981 to around 14 per cent in 1982 and 1983,69 this 
exceeding absolute absenteeism across NCB holdings, and contradicting the 
slight downward national trend, from 12.4 per cent in the financial year 1980-1 
to 10.8 per cent in the six months to October 1981 and then 10.1 per cent in 
1982-3.70 Union representatives claimed that Seafield’s problems, including 
low employee motivation and the absenteeism rate, arose from workforce 
anxieties about the future and ‘poor communication’ between managers and 
workers. But these anxieties were ignored or ridiculed, with consultative 
meetings increasingly dominated by management lectures – assisted ‘by use 
of the blackboard’ – on the absence of worker effort.71
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Caldow’s impatience was clear by the autumn of 1983. There was a 
particular problem with installing new cutting machinery. Union delegates 
suggested that more dialogue with the men would improve results, but 
Caldow now adopted what Alan Fox would have characterized as an utterly 
‘unitary’ managerial position.72 Proceeding on the basis that employees had 
no legitimate interests distinct from those that management unilaterally 
defined, he was intent on eliminating their involvement in planning and 
organizing the labour process. ‘Talking was not the answer’, Caldow said, and 
when the problem persisted into November he declared his intention to state 
‘precisely what he wanted done and if it was not carried out there would be 
dismissals’.73 Two further albeit brief meetings of the consultative committee 
took place before Caldow suspended joint industrial practices altogether in 
January 1984. The committee did not sit again until June 1985, three months 
after the year-long strike had finished.74
 The deterioration of relations at Seafield was reflected elsewhere in the 
Scottish coalfield in the second half of 1983, most notably at Monktonhall in 
Midlothian, scene of a seven week stoppage of work from 14 September to 7 
November. This was another major employer, with 1,570 miners, and, like 
Seafield, a young pit, opened in 1967. The production position there had been 
reasonably favourable, with the 1981-2 OMS just 0.1 tonnes below the NCB 
average, and an outgoing manager in the spring of 1983 commended by the 
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pit’s joint consultative committee for 2½ years of ‘excellent results’.75 But there 
were difficulties developing in the second and third quarters of 1983, chiefly 
relating to output,76 and these shaped a dispute which was provoked by 
William Kennedy, who moved from Polkemmet to become Monktonhall’s 
manager in the summer of 1983. This pattern of management-worker 
relations worsening under a new manager resembled developments at 
Seafield, and was noted by Monktonhall union delegates who thought that 
Wheeler had briefed Kennedy to seek confrontation with his new 
employees.77 Early in August he suspended all development work at 
Monktonhall, including drivages into the Peacock seam that unions and 
management had jointly reaffirmed as recently as May as being central to the 
pit’s long-term future.78 Kennedy told union delegates that development work 
would resume only when output increased to the point where losses were 
reversed and the pit was breaking even. David Hamilton, the colliery’s NUM 
delegate, said that suspending development work was wrong, and in any case 
should not have been announced before consultation with the workers, whose 
morale was greatly shaken by the apparent dwindling of the pit’s future 
prospects. Kennedy responded in the same terms that Caldow used at 
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Seafield. With ‘major surgery’ required to make Monktonhall ‘viable’, it was 
‘time for action not words’.79
Kennedy, again mirroring Caldow, claimed that Monktonhall’s chief 
problem was poor worker effort,80 especially at the pit’s newest face, L43, 
where production had started in March 1983, with ‘good results’ initially 
reported, before difficulties emerged in June.81 Hamilton suggested that a 
more flexible deployment of cutting machinery along the face – at the workers’ 
discretion rather than within the narrow spatial confines of managerial 
prescription – would improve production.82 Colliery managers resisted this, 
intent on tightening their control of labour and production processes, and – 
like Cowan at Seafield – eroding worker and union involvement in ‘managerial 
relations’. Instead Kennedy accused 63 face workers by letter of restricting 
effort and threatened their dismissal unless improved output ensued in the 
following two weeks. This letter was written in irregular circumstances. 
Kennedy spent a whole night shift on L43 with Hamilton on Monday 15 August 
before accepting that work was being conducted normally. But he persisted, 
inspecting the face again with other union representatives on 25 August, 
although only for part of a shift. Joint industrial regulation required that the full 
shift be inspected prior to any disciplinary procedures being initiated. So when 
Kennedy nevertheless declared his intention to threaten the men for their 
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rationing of labour,83 he directly contravened established procedures and 
further antagonized his employees.84
 Kennedy’s next provocative move was to offer voluntary redundancies 
to men aged 50 and over, with an intended target of 300 and no transfers 
available. This was made over the heads of union representatives, and so 
again broke agreed joint industrial procedures. It also countermanded an 
assurance given three months earlier by management that workers younger 
than 55 would only be offered redundancy where agreement had first been 
reached with the unions.85 Before the 7 a.m. shift on Wednesday 14 
September Hamilton called a meeting of NUM members to discuss the crisis. 
Many of the 150 men attending then reported for work several minutes late. 
Management refused to let them go underground. This deliberate lockout, 
noted Robbie Dinwoodie of The Scotsman a few weeks later, was not the act 
of management seeking to avoid confrontation,86 and those already below 
came back up and walked out. The subsequent back and night shifts voted 
not to work in protest.87
 Monktonhall union officials recommended an indefinite strike, which the 
men agreed to support on 15 September. This was made official by an NUM 
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Scottish Area delegate conference,88 just as Ian MacGregor heightened the 
tension further during his first visit as NCB chairman to Scotland. While 
praising worker effort at neighbouring Bilston Glen, where he went 
underground, MacGregor was scathing about Monktonhall’s ‘second division’ 
miners, whose alleged inability to use machinery effectively suggested 
shameful comparisons with mechanized pits in the USA.89 In this context of 
escalating worker-management conflict the Monktonhall strike lasted until 
November, supported by a one-day official stoppage across the Scottish 
coalfields on 17 October.90 McGahey, reporting privately to Triple Alliance 
steel and rail transport union allies, emphasized that the crisis was part of the 
NCB’s larger anti-union approach in Scotland,91 evidenced already at 
Seafield, and further exemplified at Monktonhall when the dispute ended in 
November, after Wheeler agreed to discuss the pit’s future with unions at 
Area level.92 Kennedy then unilaterally narrowed the allowances admitted to 
union delegates for conducting official business on NCB premises during 
working hours. ‘All persons’ should be ‘gainfully employed’, he told Hamilton, 
who on the first day back was refused permission to catch up with the 
significant backlog of union work that had accumulated during the seven week 
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stoppage.93 Anti-union activities had also been seen elsewhere as workers at 
other collieries mobilized in support of Monktonhall. At Frances on 23 
September the branch delegate, John Mitchell, was sacked after organizing a 
cash collection for the Monktonhall strikers. There was an immediate walk out 
by 400 men, and Mitchell was reinstated only after senior NUM and NCB 
officials intervened.94 At Polmaise 130 men were sent home without pay on 28 
September after arriving several minutes late, having attended a union 
meeting to collect cash for Monktonhall. John McCormack, Polmaise union 
delegate, interpreted this as a lockout, engineered by Donald Cameron, pit 
manager, as revenge for the ‘row in July’, when the workforce had opposed 
the Cardowan transfers.95
Polmaise, with these tense management-worker relations signalling 
more profound problems, duly assumed a central position in the crisis 
developing in the industry in the winter of 1983-4. Like Kinneil in 1982 it was a 
‘development’ pit. No coal was being mined but it contained substantial 
reserves, employed 400 men, and had been the subject of investment 
amounting to £22 million since 1980. Now, again like Kinneil, Wheeler 
proposed writing this off and closing the pit, citing substantial geological 
difficulties, and offering transfers to the Longannet complex from where the 
Polmaise reserves could be accessed.96 The NCB communicated its decision 
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to close Polmaise to the NUM’s Scottish Area representatives on 13 January 
1984.97 Wheeler had said – when announcing Cardowan’s demise in May 
1983 – that no more colliery closures were envisaged in Scotland, and that 
the Polmaise investment guaranteed ‘long-term’ job security at the pit.98 On 
26 January, just eight months later, Wheeler visited the pit’s welfare club to 
confirm Polmaise’s end.99 On 6 February the NCB ratified this decision, 
communicated in writing to the various unions involved, which then exercised 
their right to a final appeal under the board’s Colliery Review Procedure. This 
was scheduled for 14 March, but was not heard, given the outbreak of the 
national strike on 12 March.100
 McGahey and other Scottish union officials were being pressed by their 
members, especially from Polmaise, to engineer an official Area-wide strike 
against the threat of closures and management’s abrasive conduct. Area 
executive and delegate meetings, on 13 February, faced a counter-veiling 
strand of opinion. Cautious, to an extent demoralized by the apparent 
difficulties of mounting effective collective action against closures and 
Wheeler’s anti-unionism, this strand initially prevailed, with immediate strike 
action rejected.101 But at the same time an official response to the crisis was 
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staked out, with pithead meetings of members across the coalfield and then 
Area executive and delegate meetings on 20 February securing authority for 
the Scottish Area executive to call any action deemed necessary to halt 
closures.102 These meetings formed the basis for the legitimacy of the 
subsequent strike in Scotland. Unlike parallel legal initiatives in England and 
Wales in the course of 1984, which resulted in the London High Court ruling 
that the strike in these countries was illegal, on the grounds that the NUM had 
broken its rules by not balloting members,103 efforts by working miners in 
Scotland to have the strike similarly outlawed in the High Court in Edinburgh 
were unsuccessful. Lord Jauncey ruled in November 1984 that the NUM’s 
Scottish Area had acted according to its rules and therefore legally, obtaining 
the agreement of members for strike action at the pit head meetings in 
February.104
The strike in Scotland would be in support not just of Polmaise, but 
other pits in difficulty, notably Bogside, the closure of which was announced in 
the first week of February.105 This was the result of flooding, the crisis shaped 
initially in the context of the NUM overtime ban, in place since November, 
designed to pressurize the NCB on the annual wage claim and the potential 
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threat of pit closures.106 In Scotland there was the added complicating 
element of Wheeler’s response to the ban. Unlike other area chairmen, from 
December he refused to countenance special precautionary measures at 
weekends, when the NUM action prevented the normal conduct of safety and 
maintenance operations. Wheeler placed particular fetters on members of the 
British Association of Colliery Managers, stopping them from operating 
surface machinery, normally handled by NUM members, which enabled the 
safety men, members of the NACODS union, to run the pumps and fans 
underground that kept pits in operation.107 This differed from the practice 
adopted in England and Wales, where colliery managers were providing 
safety cover.108
It was in this context of escalating tension that the ‘rolling’ strike across 
the Scottish, English and Welsh coalfields commenced on 12 March. 
Conventional accounts generally agree on two key ‘triggers’ in the first week 
of March: the surprise announcement of the closure of Cortonwood colliery, 
which led to an official Area-wide strike in Yorkshire, resembling 
developments in Scotland, and the peak level joint industrial talks in London, 
when the NCB’s proposed budget and production target for 1984-5 indicated 
a requirement to close 20 pits with perhaps 20,000 job losses, the burden of 
these cuts falling in the ‘heavy losing’ areas of Scotland, South Wales and 
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Kent.109 McGahey emerged from these talks and, as has often been recorded, 
grimly declared that a ‘domino’ effect strike would develop, starting in 
Scotland and Yorkshire on 12 March, and joined incrementally by the NUM’s 
other federal areas – adopting similar methods of consultation to those used 
in Scotland – until the entire coalfield was out.110 This indirect route to a 
national strike would obviate the need for a national ballot, the outcome of 
which was difficult to predict, given that the issue of pit closures was 
potentially divisive, not affecting all members equally.111 The demand by a 
majority of Scottish miners for a militant response in defence of their pits 
would consequently be met, the prospect of broader mobilization across the 
British coalfields helping to overcome the opposition of the minority of miners 
in Scotland who were resistant to collective action.112
 These peak level and Yorkshire developments were clearly significant 
in shaping the timing of the outbreak of the strike. But it is important also to re-
emphasize that the strike in Scotland was based on the substantial reservoir 
of tension developing at pit level in the course of the preceding fifteen months 
or so, and the NUM Scottish Area’s careful and tortuously constructed 
response. Wheeler’s unyielding approach, evident in the handling of the 
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Cardowan closure and the subsequent transfers and lock-outs at other pits, 
and the non-conduct of weekend safety work in the course of the NUM 
overtime ban, had contributed in significant measure to the entrenchment of 
workplace conflict across the Scottish coalfield, particularly at Seafield, 
Monktonhall and Polmaise. The Scotsman, following NCB intelligence, 
predicted that 50 per cent of NUM members in Scotland would ignore their 
Area executive and work normally,113 but this was over-optimistic. Only at 
Bilston Glen were there enough miners to produce coal on the morning of 12 
March, and even this pit was closed later that day, the afternoon shift kept out 
by an enlarged picket line, reinforced by a coach load of angry and 
determined Polmaise men. Production, Scottish Office officials noted, was 
now ‘at a standstill’ across the Scottish coalfield.114
 Strike commitment in Scotland was subsequently very strong, although 
not universal. From the outset union officials were most worried about the 
position at Bilston Glen.115 Coal was being produced there by June, and ten 
per cent of its workers were back by September. At other pits strike-breaking 
was negligible until November, when, in the context of Christmas bonuses 
offered to those returning by the third week of that month, the number working 
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escalated significantly, particularly at Bilston Glen and Killoch. The existence 
of this minority of working miners was a reminder of the difficulties that faced 
the NUM in mobilizing a collective defence of jobs at endangered pits. But 
elsewhere the workplace anger evident from 1982 onwards was carried 
forward in remarkable displays of strike commitment: at the Longannet 
complex the strike was virtually solid until the end, with only a handful of 
strike-breakers; at Seafield only 11.8 per cent were working as late as 11 
February 1985, while a larger fragment, but still a minority, 32.1 per cent, 
were back at Monktonhall; and when the NUM finally sanctioned an organized 
return to work on 11 March 1985, the miners of Polmaise stayed out for one 
more week.116
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has examined details from the development and escalation of 
workplace conflict in the coal industry in Scotland to suggest an altered 
emphasis in explaining the outbreak of the national miners’ strike in 1984. 
Established perspectives generally privilege high politics, ideological tensions 
between Conservative government and NUM leadership, and the top-down 
nature of the strike, devised and enforced by Arthur Scargill and his allies on 
the national union executive. The evidence presented here indicates that the 
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strike was not imposed on Scottish miners by an ideologically-rigid national 
union leadership, but in fact drew much of its energy and impetus from the 
workforce’s resistance to the managerial strategy of cost control through pit 
closures and the downgrading of joint industrial regulation. High industrial 
politics were of significance. The deterioration of trust evident in the crisis of 
February 1981 and the subsequent arguments about the NCB’s ‘hit list’ in 
1982 and 1983 contributed to workforce anxieties and prefigured the outbreak 
of the strike in 1984, where there was a significant role for union leadership. 
NUM Scottish Area officials were broadly supportive of the union left’s attempt 
to organise a collective response to the crisis, and the national ‘rolling’ strike 
provided the broader mobilization that many regarded as a prerequisite of the 
defence of endangered Scottish pits. The competitive position too was of 
great importance. This article has demonstrated that the Scottish Area 
management’s programme of closures anticipated and was then further 
emboldened by the 1983 MMC report, with its focus on the need to reduce 
capacity and control costs. Wheeler’s strategy went beyond closures and 
cutting capacity, however, involving also a pronounced diminution of joint 
industrial management in the industry. This worried miners and their union 
officials in England and Wales as well as Scotland, and in this sense Scottish 
developments directly prefigured the strike across the British coalfields. 
The Seafield and Monktonhall cases demonstrate the various elements 
of managerial strategy, and its contribution to the serious deterioration in 
industrial relations that eventually resulted in the 1984-5 strike. At each pit 
managers sought to diminish significantly the involvement of workers and their 
union representatives in the planning and organization of production, or what 
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Alan Fox called ‘managerial relations’, the manner in which labour was 
deployed. This management attack on joint consultation and regulation, 
embedded features of coal’s industrial politics, represented a fundamental 
breach of trust. At Monktonhall a new manager was appointed who, in a drive 
to increase production and control costs, accused his employees of 
withholding their efforts and then set aside agreed industrial procedures. He 
duly provoked a lengthy stoppage of work in the autumn of 1983, and when 
this came to an end the position of trade unionism in regulating daily 
operations was further undermined, with the NUM delegate’s freedom to 
undertake union business in working hours and on NCB premises severely 
curtailed. At Seafield a new manager was also appointed in 1983, who 
recurrently explained the colliery’s production performance in terms of the 
workforce’s low diligence and high absenteeism. Dismissals were threatened 
and in January 1984 joint industrial practices suspended altogether. The 
resulting stoppage of work was still in place in March 1984, at which point – 
shaped by the projected closure of Polmaise but also by events at 
Monktonhall, Seafield and elsewhere in Scotland – the NUM’s Scottish Area 
leadership was compelled by its members to engineer the start of an official 
strike, this action coinciding with the start of the ‘rolling’ strike in Yorkshire that 
then spread across parts of the English and Southern Welsh coalfields. On 
the basis of the evidence presented here, of management’s quest for 
confrontation and deliberate cultivation of low trust relations, the strike ought 
to be seen as the direct product of workplace conflict as well as the 
consequence of deteriorating peak level relations in the context of coal’s 
diminishing market position. 
 37
 
9050 words, including footnotes, abstract and key words 
